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ABSTRACT The Fifth Generation of Communication Networks (5G) envisions a broader range of services
compared to previous generations, supporting an increased number of use cases and applications. The
broader application domain leads to increase in consumer use and, in turn, increased hacker activity. Due
to this chain of events, strong and efficient security measures are required to create a secure and trusted
environment for users. In this paper, we provide an objective overview of 5G security issues and the
existing and newly proposed technologies designed to secure the 5G environment. We categorize security
technologies usingOpen Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers and, for each layer, we discuss vulnerabilities,
threats, security solutions, challenges, gaps and open research issues. While we discuss all seven OSI
layers, the most interesting findings are in layer one, the physical layer. In fact, compared to other layers,
the physical layer between the base stations and users’ device presents increased opportunities for attacks
such as eavesdropping and data fabrication. However, no single OSI layer can stand on its own to provide
proper security. All layers in the 5G must work together, providing their own unique technology in an effort
to ensure security and integrity for 5G data.
INDEX TERMS 5G technologies, security issues, security solutions, OSI layer, 5G vulnerabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
While some still see 5G in the idea phase [1], wireless
service providers such as Verizon began taking orders for
their 5G Home product on October 1, 2018 in Houston,
Indianapolis, Los Angeles and Sacramento [2]. 5G network-
ing enables a major number of use cases compared to pre-
vious generations. In fact, while increasing the attainable
data rate was the main driver in previous generations, in 5G
this represents one among other objectives, such as ultra-
low latency, ultra-dense network support, and heterogeneous
quality of service support. Due to the ever-increasing demand
for a networked society with unlimited access to informa-
tion every time and everywhere, 5G networks employ novel
architectures and technologies to overcome all the limitations
imposed by previous generations [3]. Nevertheless, capac-
ity and data rates represent one of the design objectives.
In fact, new use cases such as virtual reality, augmented
reality, High Definition (HD) screening, and video streaming
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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demand high transmission rates. This is further complicated
by the fact that the number of connected devices is increasing,
therefore so is the demand for higher cell capacity. Some
of the key targets regarding cellular environments envision
peak data rates of 20 Gbps in downlink and 10 Gbps in
uplink, with a connection density of 1M devices per km2 [4].
Research predicts billons of connected sensors [5] and over
200 million devices to be deployed soon [6]. In order
to cope with such requirements, technologies as massive
Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) and beamforming
are considered key enablers. Furthermore, in order to avoid
the limitation given by a crowded spectrum, a shift toward
Millimeter Wave (mmWave) transmissions with carrier fre-
quencies above 6 Ghz has been proposed, and significant
research contributions have been devoted to its implemen-
tation [7]. As new use cases arise, end-to-end latency and
reliability have drawn significant attention from the research
community. Among the others, Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency
Communication (URLLC) is a service envisioned for 5G net-
work, which finds its enhancement in its extreme version [8].
Extreme URLLC envisions a network able to provide < 1 ms
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latency and 1− 10−9 reliability. This type of communication
enables the use of cases such as vehicular communications
and telesurgery. New network paradigms have also been pro-
posed to guarantee the strict requirements of the Fifth Gener-
ation of Communication Networks (5G) networks. Software
Defined Network (SDN) and Network Function Virtualiza-
tion (NFV) are expected to provide the programmability lack-
ing in previous cellular generations by replacing dedicated
network components with programmable ones able to accom-
modate multiple network requirements [9]. This facilitates
better user experience, as components may be adapted on the
fly responding to punctual requirements. A further proposal
is Infromation Centric Networking (ICN), in which content is
delivered based on a pre-assigned name, replacing previous
address-based routing paradigms. ICN has the advantage of
reducing the distance between the user and the information,
therefore providing a betterment both in terms of latency and
content availability [10]. Over the life of 5G, seven trillion
wireless devices are expected to be connected [11], there-
fore privacy and integrity are of fundamental importance
in implementing diverse technologies. To protect the privacy
and integrity of data traversing 5G networks, multiple layers
of security using diverse technologies are required [11]–[13].
5G will provide the underlying infrastructure that supports
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [5], among the others, with a
particular focus on protection of devices from eavesdropping
and spectrum sensing.
Existing architectures place most of their security focus
above the physical layer. However, with the deployment
of 5G, the physical layer will provide an attack surface
with threats such as eavesdropping of communication.
Physical-Layer Security (PLS) solutions have been proposed
to mitigate eavesdropping, including multiple technologies
and strategies such as beamforming, power control, and
joint clustering [14]. Internet of Things (IoT) also represents
one of the core applications of 5G, whose security impor-
tance has been discussed in literature [6]. While this work
does not directly reference 5G use cases, IPsec will be an
important security mechanism for the overall 5G environ-
ment [6]. Annessi et al. [15] discuss the importance of IPsec
between the core network and the base station. Heteroge-
neous Network (HetNet), MIMO and mmWave are among
the emerging technologies that can be exploited for security
purposes [16], [17].
Due to their recent development and success, bitcoin and
cryptocurrency in general, can be deemed as an important
component of the 5G environment. Newegg and one US-
based Subway restaurant among numerous other companies
accept bitcoin payments, which is an indicator that bitcoin is
becomingmore accepted by the general population [18]–[20].
As such, their privacy and security issues shall be tackled
along with 5G security. The work by Conti et al. discusses
the bitcoin blockchain from the application layer [21]. The
authors discuss security and privacy issues and solutions
related to the blockchain and the exploited consensus pro-
tocol, such as transaction malleability and the ‘‘SegWit’’
solution [21], [22]. G. Vidan and V. Lehdonvirta also mention
the bitcoin security issue of transaction malleability [23].
5G will support a highly anticipated technology, i.e., con-
nected cars [24]. Eiza et al. [25] propose a protocol to
addresses reliable, secure, and privacy-aware real-time video
streaming. Yoo [26] reported security issues in 5G enabled
vehicular networks and propose public key cryptography as a
possible solution to address those issues. Hussain et al. [27]
review the security issues in the design and implementation
of VANET while integrating it with 5G.
In this paper, we provide a review of 5G security issues
and security, categorized according to the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model layers. As shown in Table 1,
the OSI model provides a protocol framework for network
communication using seven distinct layers [28]. The objec-
tive of this paper is to provide an overview of 5G security
technology, vulnerabilities, solutions, and challenges suitably
organized according to their belonging to the communication
layer. To fully understand the security issues and solutions for
5G networks we use the OSI protocol stack instead of 4-layer
TCP/IP format or other layered models. OSI provides three
additional layers compared to TCP/IP, namely presentation,
session, data link, and physical layers. In TCP/IP instead,
application, presentation and session layers are comprised in
the application layer, while the network interface layer takes
on the functionalities of the data link and physical layers of
the seven-layered OSI approach. Therefore, considering the
OSI layers allows us to provide a more detailed assessment of
the security aspects. Application-driven services, such as the
services automated vehicles, AR/VR, and others, are consid-
ered to be some of the major innovations in 5G system and
beyond. As such, it is very important to secure the application
layer. Though in practice, the presentation and session layers
may be incorporated into the application and transport layers,
respectively, we want to look at the security issues in the
session layer and presentation layer functionalities in depth.
This in-depth view allows us to look at the security issues
in detail rather than looking at the application and transport
layer in a shallower fashion. As we will show in section IV
and section V, there are several security issues in the pre-
sentation and session layers functionalities need to be taken
care of at the design stage.We should therefore consider these
security issues for secure by-design 5G. Similarly, as outlined
in section IX, there are several physical layer security issues
for the 5G compared to other layers. It is hence important to
highlight and differentiate the security issues at the physical
layer and the data link layer. Moreover, as described in sec-
tions VII and VIII, several issues in the network and data
link layers require immediate attention. Therefore, a more
detailed survey including these additional layers will help
the research community to analyze the issues in a detailed
manner.
5Gwill impact multiple layers of the OSI model, therefore,
our study categorizes each security issue by the OSI layer it
lies within. Due to the increase of security threats expected
with the deployment of 5G, it is important to understand what
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TABLE 1. OSI layers.
risks companies and individuals will face in the future, and
how to mitigate them in the 5G deployment. As we later
show, the organization according to OSI layers allows for a
better coverage of all the security and privacy related aspects.
We provide a comparison with other available surveys on the
topic to show how our OSI-oriented approach allows for a
better investigation of 5G security and privacy.
A. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SURVEYS
We present a review of available surveys on the subject and
motivate the need for our survey. In [29], authors look at the
security of technologies such as cloud, SDNhl, and NFV.
In [30], authors review the security requirements of 5G appli-
cations from a technology perspective, focusing on incremen-
tal solutions such as physical layer security and lightweight
encryption. In [31] authors look at the core and enabling
technologies that provide 5G security, specifically looking
at security monitoring and management of 5G networks.
In addition, their work also evaluates the existing related
security measures and baselines. The physical layer security
issues were reviewed in [32], where authors surveyed security
issues surrounding promising 5G technologies such as secu-
rity coding and millimeter wave communications that impact
the physical layer. Ferrag et al., look at both 4G and 5G secu-
rity issues from the authentication and privacy-preserving
schemes perspective [33]. In addition to providing classi-
fication, they also provide countermeasures for issues in
authentication and privacy [33]. Ahmad et al., looked at
the privacy and security issues of 5G enabling technologies
such as SDN and NFV and recommended solutions [34].
Hussain et al. [35], look at the security issues, solutions,
and standards arising from the integration of 5G and VANET
technologies. Thus, their work does not look into 5G security
issues holistically. Sriram et al. [36] look at the rationale
of the importance of security in 5G compared to 2G/3G/4G
with a focus on the security requirements, threats, and
solutions. Also, they focus only on physical layer security.
Choudhary et al. [37], look at the security of 5G mobile
backhaul networks, discussing potential security threats, vul-
nerabilities, and key challenges. Ahmad et al. [38], describes
5G vulnerabilities and threats at the network and application
layers and provide solutions. In addition, they also outline
security issues for post-5G cellular technologies. In [39], PLS
is discussed in the context of IoT and network slicing.
Table 2 shows the OSI layers covered by each referenced
survey. We see that available surveys focus on the applica-
tion, network, and physical layer, whereas a few focus on
presentation and data-link layers, and none on the session
layer. Therefore, although some surveys on 5G security are
quite comprehensive, they do not fully cover the 7 OSI layers,
motivating the need for our survey.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
In our paper we focus on 5G security and, specifically, we
summarize the vulnerabilities and threats, security solutions
and challenges, gaps and open research issues organized by
OSI layers. Each layer presents specific protocols and archi-
tectures by means of which 5G networks can meet design
objectives such as increased connectivity, lower latency, and
high reliability. Figure 1 shows they key technologies that
we analyze in this survey, organized according to OSI layers.
Among those reported in Figure 1, we find many of the key
technologies that enable 5G networks. For instance, SDN
has been advocated as one of the main technologies able to
enhance the performance in terms of quality of service in
modern and future networks. A similar reasoning is applied to
ICN, which aims at shortening the distance between user and
content, therefore providing lower latency and higher data
availability. Among the others, also blockchain/Distributed
Ledger Technology (DLT) technology has been included in
this survey. Although its development was not strictly related
to communications technology, it now sees application in
different domains, ranging from vehicular communications,
to industrial network and network management [45]–[47].
Based on our review, we state that due to increase in wire-
less connectivity, future researchers may benefit from focus-
ing on physical layer security solutions in order to prevent
eavesdropping and other physical channel based attacks.
Furthermore, the community may also benefit from addi-
tional research on transaction malleability, due to the vulnera-
bility within the bitcoin protocol. Our study also demonstrates
that all OSI layers are important to keep the 5G environment
as secure as possible. Understanding the different 5G security
issues by OSI layer could help organizations focus their
capital expenditure.
One of the motivations to look at the security issues in
different layer is to provide perspectives to the security and
network professionals and researchers on how to tackle the
security in a layered approach. This will enable the in depth
defense concept for the security by design. This will also
allow to implement the security in a holistic manner and even
if a solution in one layer cannot address the security threat,
it can be addressed by the solution in a different, connected
layer. Such an approach provides end-to-end network security
design rather than a piece meal approach for network security
against attacks. The layered approach to security can also
help in addressing conflicting objectives such as security
through encryption and network intelligence. By looking at
the security issues in the different layers, the security and
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TABLE 2. Comparison with other surveys: OSI layers covered by each survey.
network professionals and researchers can design holistic
and efficient security protocols for the 5G networks and
beyond.
C. REVIEW METHODOLOGY
There are few works in the literature discussing vulnerabili-
ties and solutions for 5G security. In the process of reviewing
existing approaches, our initial challenge was to understand
what protocols are exploited at each OSI layer. This step
was helpful to review several OSI layer resources that point
to specific protocols, e.g., bitcoin protocol. Once created a
list of protocols at each OSI layer, we proceeded by finding
research works in the literature on 5G security discussing
the specific protocol. From there, it is imperative to gain a
basic understanding of the new 5G proposed technologies,
vulnerabilities, solutions and gaps for each protocol. It is
helpful if the technologies are discussed in several papers,
such as in the case of HetNets. Unfortunately, that was rare.
In a few cases, we identified only a single paper for a specific
protocol. The end goal was to find at least one protocol per
layer related to 5G that is discussed in literature, and that was
achieved.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide
an overview of the evolution of the mobile network starting
from 1G up to 5G, discussing the different security needs and
vulnerabilities. In Section III to VIII we discuss respectively
the application, presentation, session, transport, network, data
link and physical layers. Each section is separated in three
subsections: the first introducing basic concepts on the dis-
cussed layer, the second discussing its security and vulner-
abilities, and the third discussing the solutions, challenges
and gaps. In Section X we summarize the review of 5G
security challenges and explains the recommendations for
futurework. Finally, in SectionXIwe conclude the paper with
the summary of the work.
II. SECURITY THREATS EVOLUTION
Telecommunication network first appeared in the 1980s with
the first generation of mobile networks (1G), and evolved
during the past 40 years leading to the 5G. Starting from
an analog network for voice only communications and with
poor security features, it now provides ubiquitous connec-
tion for multiple types of users with enhanced security and
privacy guarantees. Successive generations were introduced
mitigating the vulnerabilities of the previous generations, but
at the same time introducing new threat vectors due to the
new employed technologies. In order to fully understand the
security threats and needs of 5G we here review the technolo-
gies employed in the different generations and discuss their
security vulnerabilities and features.
A. 1G SECURITY
The 1G was mainly based on analog technologies, with main
and only target being voice call services [48]. However,
the range was limited to single countries. The 1G networks
were also knew as AdvancedMobile Phone Systems (AMPS)
in USA and as Nordic Mobile Telephony (NMT) in Europe.
Data network and roaming services were not part of the 1G
network, and the maximum speed was limited to 2.4 Kbps.
It showed a large number of shortcomings, such as insuf-
ficient capacity, poor use of spectrum, bad quality of voice
calls and reckless handoff. Furthermore, it provided no secu-
rity solutions allowing for call eavesdropping by unwanted
listeners [49]. The security threat was further complicated by
the fact that 1G networks did not allow for encryption due
to their analog nature. Thanks to the clear-text nature of these
communications, an attacker was also able to easily obtain not
only access to the phone call, but also to other information
such as the mobile identification number, or the electronic
serial number. By capturing these values, an attacker was able
to run impersonation attacks by cloning the phone and imper-
sonating the subscriber. The first security measure introduced
in 1G was scrambling, which allowed for prevention against
eavesdropping.
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FIGURE 1. Overview of the key technologies and protocols analyzed in
this survey.
B. 2G SECURITY
The second generation (2G) of mobile networks was intro-
duced a decade after 1G, adding messaging services (via
SMS) along with voice communication. 2G introduced a
large number of technologies around the world, such as Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA), North America Time
Division Multiple Access (NA-TDMA), Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM) and Personal Digital Cel-
lular (PDC). Furthermore, e-mails were first supported by
mobile communications [50]. 2G provided the shift from
the analog to the digital world in mobile communications,
and hence allowed for the introduction of a large number
of security measures [31]. Authentication was first intro-
duced in mobile communications thanks to cryptography,
where secret keys were used to encrypt traffic and pro-
vide confidentiality in the communication. The identity of
the subscribers was verified by introducing the Subscriber
Identity Module (SIM) devices, i.e., physical devices stor-
ing a cryptovariable used in the authentication process. 2G,
however, was vulnerable to multiple attacks. For instance,
spammingwas one of themain threat vectors, where attackers
aimed at transmitting unwanted information to victim users.
Furthermore, the design implementation of some of the secu-
rity solutions were not properly addressed. Relevant exam-
ples are the COMP128 andA5 cryptographic algorithms [51].
Furthermore, GSM encryption was limited to the radio
interface, whereas communications channels were deemed
as secure and therefore not protected against eavesdrop-
pers [51]. SMS were also vulnerable to attacks, as the roam-
ing of messages was exposed to attackers on the Internet [31].
C. 3G SECURITY
The third generation of mobile network (3G) was introduced
a decade after the 2G and brought the advantage of ser-
vices based on the Internet Protocol (IP). 3G saw a signif-
icant improvement in terms of quality of service, allowing
for services like global roaming and highly improved voice
quality. The main technologies introduced with 3G were
Wideband CDM (WCDMA), Universal Telecommunication
Systems (UMTS), and High Speed Uplink/Downlink Packet
Access (HSUPA/HSDPA). Shifting from 3G to the fourth
generation (4G), 3.75G introduced the fundamental technolo-
gies for mobile data services such as Long-Term Evolution
technology (LTE) and Fixed Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access (WIMAX). The security of 3G accounted
for all the vulnerabilities identified in 2G and corrected
them. The security architecture deployed in 3G communica-
tions was composed of five sets: i) network access security,
ii) network domain security, iii) user domain security,
iv) application security and v) visibility and configurability
security. The design of the security features of 3G also pro-
vided higher flexibility, and the possibility for extension to
mitigate new threats that may be identified after their deploy-
ment [52]. Due to the increased pool of devices involved
in the network, the attack surface also increased. In fact,
multiple security threats were reported targeting the operating
system, the users’ phone, and the computer system. Such
vulnerabilities included gain of authorizations in accessing
users’ sensitive information, eavesdropping, and imperson-
ation attacks. Impersonation was not only limited to the sub-
scriber, but was also exploited to impersonate the user or the
network [31]. Further attacks included man-in-the-middle,
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denial of service, location update spoofing, and camping on
a false base station.
D. 4G SECURITY
4G improved the existing network by including a full and reli-
able solution entirely based on IP. The higher data rate com-
pared to that attained by the previous generations allowed for
sharing data and multimedia ubiquitously in the network. The
main technologies introducedwith 4GwereMultimediaMes-
saging Service (MMS), Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB),
video chat, High Definition TV content, and mobile TV [53],
[54]. 4G provided the security features needed to mitigate
all the attacks identified in the previous generations, together
with new cryptographic algorithms with improved key struc-
tures. The main algorithms introduced were EPS Encryption
Algorithms (EEA) and EPS Integrity Algorithms (EIA), and
used keys were 256-bits long (twice the length of those used
in 3G) [52]. Another of the main differences compared to the
previous generations is that control and user planes traffic
exploited different algorithm and key sizes. Authentication
was here provided by means of the Authentication and Key
Agreement (AKA) protocol, whereas integrity and protection
from replay attacks was guaranteed via NAS (Non-Access
Stratum) and RRC (Radio Resource Control)-signaling pro-
tocol. IPSec was used to encrypt backhaul traffic [55], [56].
However, due to the connection of the cellular network with
the internet network thanks to the end-to-end IP framework,
4G is vulnerable to a large number of attacks coming from the
internet. All attack vectors targeting the basic functioning of
the IP protocol are now a viable solution to attack the cellular
network. Examples of such attacks include address spoofing,
TCP SYNflood attack, TCP RST attack and hijack, Denial of
Service, user ID theft, and intrusion attacks [57]. The higher
computing power of mobile devices also creates new attack
surfaces, as powerful attacks may also be generated from the
devices in the cellular network. Furthermore, 4G supported
technologies such asWi-Fi andWIMAX, therefore inheriting
all the security issues of these technologies [33].
E. 5G SECURITY
5G is creating an even more interconnected network, where
devices with different capabilities and quality of service
constraints need to interoperate [58]. 5G is hence also fac-
ing the ever-increasing demand of users for connection and
ubiquitous access to the network. Compared to previous
generations, 5G is expected to solve six challenges, namely
higher capacity, higher data rate, lower end-to-end latency,
massive device connectivity, reduced cost, and consistent
Quality of Service. At the same time, attackers capabilities
also increased compared to the previous generations. In fact,
the computational power of current mobile devices allows
for launching complicated attacks from inside the mobile
network. Furthermore, the type of attacks and generated mal-
wares are more efficient and effective than those faced by
previous generations. This leads to attacks being driven by
stronger aims compared to previous generations, including
big cyber-crime rings with clear financial, political, and per-
sonal motives. This is further motivated by the fact that the
mobile network is not limited to voice and video calls, but also
supports a large number of other services and devices [58],
creating a wide attack surface that may lead to severe dis-
ruption in the functioning of one of the interconnected
networks.
Due to the larger number of services and connected
devices, and despite the introduced security measure, 5G
may still be vulnerable to different types of attacks. In the
next sections we will discuss the identified vulnerabilities,
organizing the technologies and the associated threat vectors
according to the OSI model.
III. APPLICATION LAYER
The application layer (layer 7) is the layer that processes and
formats data so that it can be passed to layer 6, the presenta-
tion layer [59]. Layer 7 is the closest layer to the application
itself. Application based encryption is considered to be an
effective security mechanism for those applications placed
onto layer 7 [14]. However, the application layer does not
include the applications rather the application protocols [59].
As previously discussed, 5G envisions a broader appli-
cation domain compared to previous generations. In this
section, we review some of the application layer services in
different use cases, such as vehicular communications, ICN,
blockchain/DLT, SDN, and Artificial Intelligence (AI).
• Vehicular communications represent, among others, one
of the new use cases enabled by 5G networks. In fact,
it exploits one of the core features envisioned by 5G,
i.e., very low latency and ultra-reliability. By means of
On-Board Equipments (OBEs), vehicles are connected
to the network and exchange data with other network
entities, such as other vehicles, pedestrians, and infras-
tructures. This allows both vehicles and other involved
entities to collect and process data, such that services
like autonomous driving, secure mobility management,
and real time video sharing can be achieved [40]. The
application layer in this context is exploited for different
purposes. First, the application layer is responsible for
OBEs identity. Second, it is exploited to obtain network
topology, resource configuration, and other informa-
tion to adjust the current network configuration. In this
section, we review the security issues associated with
applications for vehicular communications.
• Blockchain and DLT have recently drawn significant
attention from the scientific community, with appli-
cations not only in the exchange of cryptocurrencies,
but also for networking purposes. Bitcoin is the first
introduced blockchain, providing an application layer
protocol with an open-source design [21]. Bitcoin was
presented in 2008, introducing the concept of a peer-
to-peer electronic cash exchange [60]. The peer-to-peer
exchange concept removes the traditional middle entity,
such as an FDIC ensured bank. This means that the
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transaction can be anonymous, free from government
eyes and government taxes. Despite its controversy,
Bitcoin is accepted at numerous companies, including
newegg.com, a few Subway franchises and small local
companies like Grass Hill Alpacas [18]–[20]. Bitcoin’s
ledger function is based on blockchain [61]. Anyone
with access to a computer can use bitcoin. In fact,
Bitcon.org walks individuals and businesses through
creating a bitcoin wallet and buying bitcoin. Starting
from the launch of Bitcoin, other applications, such as
Hyperledger, have made use of the blockchain technol-
ogy [61], [62]. While anonymity is synonymous with
Bitcoin, it is not synonymous with blockchain. Among
the others, blockchains find applications in networking
for vehicular communications, IoT, as well as in the
design of radio access networks [63], [64]. The paper
by [62] explores how blockchain can be used to create
secure smart homes. Since Bitcoin has clearly gained
acceptance in the modern economy, we review it here
in relation to 5G security.
• ICN has been proposed as a novel approach in 5G
networks to shift from a user-centric paradigm to a
data-centric one. The idea is to enable in-network
caching and replication by having data independent from
location, application, storage, and means of transporta-
tion. Therefore, each data/content is assigned a specific
name, and is retrieved without knowing the physical
location of the content provider. This provides a signif-
icant shift compared to IP based networks, allowing for
a significant reduction in network traffic and commu-
nications delay. Among the others, ICN has been pro-
posed as an implementation at the application layer [65].
Also, ICN plays an important role in the IoT context.
In fact, since devices such as smart sensors and meters
are becoming increasingly powerful, they start to act
like users, and therefore have specific requirements at
the application layer [66]. ICN is used in this context
to provide higher network throughput and smaller trans-
mission delays.
• SDN enables a more flexible network management com-
pared to the traditional architectures. A global view of
the network is maintained at the SDN software-based
controllers, which receive requests from the different
applications and provide them with resources to guar-
antee the required quality of service. At the application
layer, SDN involves network components to provide
abstraction and supervision for a proper network config-
uration at any time, as well as orchestration and resource
allocation [67].
• AI is now largely adopted as a solution in different
domains and all those applications in which classical
methods for function parametrization or estimation are
not viable. In its supervised implementation, AI exploits
previously collected data to train a proper model, and
successively takes decisions on newly generated data.
AI is widely diffused in the wireless domain, finding
applications such as channel estimation, fault recovery,
and resource allocation [68]. We here focus on the chal-
lenges and security issues posed by the application of AI
at the application layer.
A. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
As new kinds of services and paradigms are implemented
at the application layer, the associated security and pri-
vacy threats pose a significant challenge for their successful
deployment. Figure 2 summarizes the security and privacy
threats at the application layer.
1) VEHICULAR NETWORKS
We discussed in the previous section how OBEs are in charge
of dealing with the identities of each vehicle. This represents
a privacy threat, because if an OBE is using the same identity
in multiple broadcast messages, it is possible for an attacker
to track the movements of the vehicle and hence compromise
its privacy. Furthermore, application layer identities managed
by OBEs should be protected from eavesdropping [40]. Since
OBEs are also in charge of adjustments to the network topol-
ogy based on the collected information [69], attacks from
the users or central control may cause issues. Examples of
associated threats are given by unencrypted transmission,
information leakage, and resource depletion. Regarding the
novel services guaranteed by 5G to vehicular communica-
tions, authors in [25] propose a protocol for video exchange
based on the application layer. However, this protocol was
deemed as non-secure by [26]. In fact, the protocol is vulner-
able to several attacks, such as impersonation, forged video
upload, and lack of proper separation between authorities.
Therefore, it is essential to have a clear overview of all the
application components, and to foresee all possible leverages
that could undermine security and privacy.
2) BLOCKCHAIN
Among blockchain-based currencies, Bitcoin is the most
widely used cryptocurrency thus far [21]. According to [21],
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) represents a threat
toward the Bitcoin protocol. DDoS attacks are capable of
causing security breaches to Bitcoin currency exchanges,
mining pools, and eWallets [21]. Therefore, the same
issues can be reflected into the network application of the
blockchain technology. For instance, in vehicular applica-
tions, a DDoS attack may cause the vehicle disconnection
from the infrastructure, causing major damages to both the
vehicle and the people in it. Transaction malleability has
been pointed out as a cause for security issues [21], [23].
Blockchain uses cryptography to secure the peer-to-peer
transaction [70]. Cryptography can be vulnerable if the wrong
type of algorithm is used. For example, there is SHA-256
and double SHA-256. Among these two algorithms, double
SHA-256 is the less vulnerable because it is not susceptible
to length extension attacks [70]. Additional vulnerabilities to
blockchain are replay attacks, sybil attacks, impersonation
attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks [70]. Another major
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threat is given by the consensus protocol. In particular, 51%
attack represents one of the major attacks, in which themajor-
ity of the mining power in the network is controlled by a
single entity. In this case, this entity may control transactions
preventing some of them to be concluded. This also allows
the attacker to undermine the possibility of other users get-
ting reward for mining a transaction, therefore monopolizing
the reward associated with mining. Furthermore, this would
allow the attacker to perform a double spend, in which the
same asset is spent twice in the network due to the fact that
the attacker gets to mine a transaction at the required time
creating a fork in the network [21]. In an initial deployment
state, where the network is populated by a small number of
devices, the 51% attack represents a concrete threat for the
consensus. Therefore, blockchain application designs shall
consider all the significant threats highlighted in literature
before obtaining a successful deployment.
3) INFORMATION-CENTRIC NETWORKING
Privacy represents one of the major problems in ICN. In fact,
data is associated with names that reveal significant informa-
tion to a passive eavesdropper. Names in ICN serve both as
identifier and locator of data, allowing attackers to infer the
identity of the provider based on the content. In a watchlist
attack, a malicious user is able to build a predefined list
of content names to monitor. The attacker then performs a
real-time filtering to delete the request or the content itself
based on the users’ requests. Therefore the attacker is able
to censor a content, or to perform a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack toward a user accessing the content in the watchlist.
Furthermore, the attacker is able to monitor a large number
of requests for a certain content, hence jeopardizing the pri-
vacy of the users searching for that content [71]. ICN names
are user-generated content that is recorded into the routing
table. This implies that it is possible for a malicious user
to act on the application layer to run a resource exhaustion
attack. The very same freedom given by name spaces can
also be used by producer applications to advertise any desired
namespace [72]. A further threat is given by the possibility
of an attacker being able to breach the signer’s key. In fact,
an attacker retrieving a certain content also has access to the
singer’s public key and signature. This can be used with the
content itself to determine the signer’s key [71].
4) SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK
The application layer of SDN architectures is vulnerable
to multiple attacks, given by surfaces such as malicious or
bugged applications and weak authorization or authentica-
tion [73]. For instance, third-party and control applications
may be compromised if not equipped with proper authority
restrictions. This may imply the execution of shut down or
disconnect commands with the attacker gaining privileges
over those applications. A further threat at the application
layer is given by the installation of malicious applications
on top of the controller. Such malicious applications can
be exploited to manipulate and control packet handlers,
by means of packet discard, reordering and disrupting proper
packet forwarding. Furthermore, the same applications can be
used to infer information about users’ activities by means of
packet sniffing. Another threat surface is given by the north-
bound interface, which connects the application plane with
the control plane. In case of vulnerable protocols, Application
Program Interfaces (APIs), or those without a proper encryp-
tion, sensitive information may be exposed to attackers,
showing the information exchanged between the controller
and the target application [73]. The SDN application layer
is also vulnerable toward DoS attacks and their distributed
version [74].
5) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
One of the most critical threats toward AI is given by
adversarial learning. The attacker aims at injecting mali-
cious data inside the learning model, such that training is
performed based on malformed/corrupted data. Considering,
for instance, classification problem, the goal of adversarial
learning is to inject malicious data such that classification
no longer return the correct output. The assumption here is
that the attacker is able to infer information from the legiti-
mately trained classifier, such that an adversarial dataset can
be built [75]. Therefore, an application leaking this kind of
information or that can be queried from an external actor is
sensitive to adversarial learning attacks. These two scenarios
also arise a threat toward the privacy of users. In fact, if the
training set is based on costumers’ behavior or sensitive
information, by querying the learning model, it is possible for
an attacker to gather statistical information regarding users or
to perform model inversion [76].
B. SECURITY SOLUTIONS, CHALLENGES AND GAPS
In vehicular networks, OBEs should carefully manage com-
munication between different layers in order to notify
changes in identities at the different layers. From an appli-
cation layer perspective, OBE identity shall be protected
from eavesdropping. A new protocol [25], is specific to 5G
enabled vehicular networks and addresses reliable, secure and
privacy-aware real-time video. In [26], authors analyzes and
provides additional security solutions to that proposed in [25].
In order to solve for impersonation attack and forged video
upload, public key cryptography is proposed as possible
solution.
Transaction malleability has been resolved with
‘‘segwit’’ [21], which is implemented as a soft fork change in
bitcoin’s transaction format [22]. Conti et al. [21] conclude
that for Bitcoin’s continued success, it is important that the
Bitcoin network scale easily as it grows in popularity and
use. Currently, Bitcoin protocol can complete approximately
seven transactions per second compared to Visa, which can
complete approximately 2000 transactions per second [23].
The outstanding question is whether new security risks will
arise while proposing a modified Bitcoin protocol to support
greater transactions per second. Bitcoin protocol uses a hash
functions such as SHA-256, so it will be important for the
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FIGURE 2. Security and privacy threats at the application layer.
Bitcoin protocol to bemodified to work with stronger hashing
algorithms as they are developed [21]. Several blockchain
vulnerabilities can be addressed via Lightning Network and
Smart Contract (LNSC) [70], [77]. The LNSC is expected
to resolve replay attack, impersonation attack and man-in-
the-middle attack [70] due to the lightning network’s trading
management system and the smart contract’s general-purpose
computations [77]. The sybil attack, which makes use of
several fake identities controlled by a single lead fake identity,
can be avoided by using TrustChain [70].
In SDN environments, DoS and its distributed version at
the application layer pose a significant threat. Therefore,
detection and mitigation of such attacks represents one of the
core features for security. Machine learning can be exploited
for this purpose [74]. However, has previously discussed,
machine learning is vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
In ICN, data aggregation represents a significant threat
towards users’ privacy. Therefore, solutions such as the one
proposed by authors in [78] need to be included to guarantee
arbitrary data aggregation while preserving users’ privacy.
In AI-based applications, adversarial learning poses one of
the major threats. Therefore, a secure system needs to prevent
malicious data to be injected in the learning phase. Different
solutions for robust classification and anomaly detection have
been proposed [79].
IV. PRESENTATION LAYER
The presentation layer formats the file so that the destination
computer understands how to open and present it, includ-
ing decompression and decryption of files [59], [80]. While
encryption will continue to play an important role in 5G net-
works, research points to encryption via applications rather
than at the presentation layer [14]. Vulnerabilities in layer
six can be due to weaknesses in the implementation of the
presentation layer functions [81]. Figure 3 summarizes the
security and vulnerability threats at the presentation layer.
FIGURE 3. Security and privacy threats at the presentation layer.
A. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
The insertion of malicious data into files, web pages and
applications is a common practice today. More than twenty
years ago, Handel et al. [82] reported the possibility of
hiding data in the presentation layer by using multimedia
components. In recent years, social media applications such
as YouTube, Facebook and TikTok have become very popu-
lar and are hence widely used. According to Pew Research
Center, social media usage for adults has increased from five
percent in 2005 to 72% in 2021 [83]. The increase in social
media usage is caused, in turn, by the opportunity to insert
malicious data into all forms of files used by these platforms,
including audio and video. Attackers can insert illegal input
into presentation-layer facilities in order to cause issues such
as buffer overflows [81]. Inserting illegal input into multime-
dia files is an easy task for an attacker, as these files tend to
be large in size [82]. Format string vulnerabilities can cause
a program to crash, provide attackers access control to the
program, and cause bad information to be displayed on the
output stream [81]. Lastly, since instructions for encryption
and decryption are provided at the presentation layer, this
opens up vulnerabilities related to cryptography that can be
exploited by the attackers to compromise the confidentiality
requirements [81].
B. SECURITY SOLUTIONS, CHALLENGES AND GAPS
To proactively address the vulnerabilities at the presentation
layer, Reed [81] advises thoroughly checking input resulting
from the interaction of layers seven and five. This points
to the need to provide security at all OSI layers, with each
layer working together to guarantee the most secure network
possible. Short-cuts in implementation plans that skip over a
multi-layer security assessment may end up being disastrous.
In addition, it is important to carefully review cryptography
protocols periodically, considering the past issues arising
with previously released crypto-solutions [81]. This is needed
to ensure that not only the existing vulnerabilities and security
issues are taken care of, but also to make sure that the emerg-
ing threats are proactively addressed before they result in
an issue. In addition, the security solutions should diligently
validate the input to create a clear delineation from the user
input data to the data generated by the program, such that
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the user input is safe to be used [81]. Any redesign to the
presentation layer to resolve security concerns is expected to
create additional opportunities for exploitation [82]. Hackers
will hence maintain the ability to insert illegal input and take
advantage of the format string vulnerabilities in 5G networks
as well, if this is not properly mitigated.
V. SESSION LAYER
The session layer is used for application-to-application com-
munications. This layer opens the communication connec-
tion, keeps it openwhile data is transferred, then closes it once
the transfer is complete [59]. Session layer provides three
security services: authentication, authorization and session
restoration [84]. Examples of layer 5 protocols are Pass-
word Authentication Protocol (PAP), Remote Procedure Call
(RPC) and NetBIOS [84]. Furthermore, an authentication
framework that is widely used in wireless networks is Exten-
sible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [59]. EAP framework
provides the flexibility for authentication protocols to fit the
specific need of an individual environment [59], [85], [86].
Abdrabou et al. indicate that in 4G environments, EAP-AKA
is modified to support LTE and named Evolved Packet
SystemAuthentication andKeyAgreement (EPS-AKA) [59].
For 5G networks, authentication is supported by 5G AKA
and EAP-AKA’, which is the 5G version of EPS-AKA [87].
5G-AKA and EAP-AKA’ are important for secure 5G
networking, as they address several vulnerabilities in 4G
authentication while being used to authenticate the nodes.
Furthermore, they also support the Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS) [59]. Figure 4 summa-
rizes the security and vulnerability threats at the session layer.
A. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
PAP is not very secure, as its credentials are sent in
plaintext [59]. This allows an attacker to run sniffing and
man-in-the-middle attacks [59]. Systems sometimes are built
to use PAP as the last attempt to attaining authentication if
other, more robust, authentication protocols do not work [59].
RPC fails to provide secure authentication [59], opening up
the possibility of malicious activity. NetBIOS can be set up
to permit shared resources in Windows environments [59].
Accordingly, this vulnerability can be used to discover
information about various machines on a Windows NT
network [88]. EAP as a stand-alone framework does not
have security vulnerabilities. However, its variants may be
non-secure [89]. An implementation vulnerability for the
variant EAP-GSS and LEAP is a dictionary attack, which
uses common words in a brute-force attempt to break the
code [89]. EAP can use PAP and therefore may be vulnerable
to threats associated with PAP [89]. EPS-AKA vulnerabilities
include disclosure of the user identity, man-in-the-middle
attacks and DoS attacks [90], [91].
B. SECURITY SOLUTIONS, CHALLENGES AND GAPS
To aid with the PAP plaintext vulnerability, administrators
can build the system to support the Challenge Handshake
FIGURE 4. Security and privacy threats at the session layer.
Authentication Protocol (CHAP) [59]. To circumvent the
NetBIOS vulnerability, the administrator can disable the sys-
tem’s null session ability using a very strong local admin
passwords, and negate shared access to the root of the hard
drive [92]. Secure RPC (SRPC) resolves the weak authen-
tication associated with RPC [59]. Security challenges con-
tinue to exist with the EAP framework and its associated
variants, such as EPS. Examples of such vulnerabilities
include: disclosure of the user identity, man-in-the-middle
attacks, and DoS attacks. 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA’ pro-
vide solutions to some of the existing authentication issues
in 4G and earlier generations [87]. Some of the key dif-
ferences between 5G-AKA and EAP-AKA’ are given by
the operational flow and the exploited key derivation func-
tions. Abdrabou and El-Wanis [86] propose the Simple Pass-
word Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) as a solution
for the vulnerabilities. Another work by David Lanzen-
berger shows the vulnerabilities associated with EAP-AKA’
and EPS-AKA*, the 5G successor to EPS-AKA. Lanzen-
berger’s research concluded that EAP-AKA’ has stricter guar-
antees with the drawback of a messaging overhead com-
pared to EPS-AKA*. However, Lanzenberger’s thesis proves
EPS-AKA* has stronger authentication properties. Per analy-
sis of Basin et al., 5G-AKA is affected by several weaknesses,
including session key agreement, unlinkability against active
attacker and implicit authentication [87].
VI. TRANSPORT LAYER
The transport layer has been referred to as the heart of the
OSI model, as it is used for computer-to-computer communi-
cations [59]. Just like the session layer, it opens communica-
tions, keeps them open and closes them once complete [59].
SDN is one of the enabling technologies for the transport
layer in 5G networks [93], [94]. It is believed that as 5G
is adopted on a mainstream basis, the SDN will to play
an important role to get the most out of 5G. As similar to
software and hardware, SDN and 5G will dovetail each other.
This section reviews transport layer information as it relates
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to the 5G/SDN combo. Figure 5 summarizes the security and
vulnerability threats at the session layer.
A. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
Transport Layer Security (TLS) from the SDN perspective
is seen as vulnerable to DoS attacks, rule modification, and
malicious rule insertion [94]. While SDN can improve the
functionality of the 5G network, it does pose security chal-
lenges. Some of the vulnerabilities associated with SDN are:
• Weak authentication for the applications and users can
lead to spoofing attacks;
• Weak authorization can also lead to man-in-the-middle
and unauthorized access related attacks.
Security vulnerabilities and challenges for SDN are possi-
ble in different planes such as Application (for example,
applications that abuse SDN control messages), Control (for
example, manipulation of system variables), Interface (Man
in the Middle attacks) and Data (Side channel attacks) [59].
In case of the application or user requesting a service from the
5G network, before routing information is created for packet
traversal, a proper authorization is required for the account-
ability purposes. Lack of encryption standards can lead to
eavesdropping or spoofing related attacks [95]. As SDN sup-
ports centralized control, it is an easy target for DoS attacks,
and exposure of important APIs to the intruder. To implement
DDoS attacks, the TCP or UDP SYN messages will be used
to flood the host [95]. As a result of the DDoS attacks,
the controller is made unavailable to serve other nodes in
order to make routing decisions, thereby reducing the perfor-
mance of the SDN networks. Due to its centralized nature, the
controller represents a potential bottleneck and enables the
adversaries to sniff the controller traffic [34]. The transport
layer protocol proposed for 5G is open transport protocol
(OTP) [96]. In OTP, TCP modifications and adaptations to
retransmit the lost or damaged TCP segments over the wire-
less link are proposed as solution for 5G networks. As per our
review, the vulnerabilities, threats and security challenges are
not studied in detail. With respect to EAP-TLS, Zhang et al.
point out several design flaws. For instance, 5G networks
and subscribers cannot agree on the mutual identification and
master key after the successful termination of the session, due
to the ambiguities in the specified standards [97].
B. SECURITY SOLUTIONS, CHALLENGES AND GAPS
Security should be pre-built into the SDN architecture, and
delivered as a service in order to provide privacy and integrity
to connected resources [94], [98]. This is made possible
by using an architecture with two communication channels,
i.e., the control and data channels. The control channel trans-
ports only the control data between the control and data
planes. On the other hand, the user communication data is
transported only through the data channel [98]. As technol-
ogy morphs and improves to release new solutions in areas
such as SDN, security should be considered. Building the
FIGURE 5. Security and privacy threats at the transport layer.
security into SDN will aid in defending against attacks at the
transport layer [94], and in turn will defend against attacks
towards the overall 5G architecture. This is achieved by
designing components to secure the SDN controller, protect-
ing the flow layer of the SDN, and hardening interfaces such
as application programming interfaces and communication
channels [94].
Since SDN inherently provides the logical centralized con-
trol, it supports robust security monitoring and protection.
It also enables rapid deployment of security policies, that may
not be easily possible in traditional security approaches. The
SDN approach by Ahmed et al. has the potential to provide
security protection not only from a virtualized environment
perspective, but also from a physical environment perspec-
tive [34]. To address the issues in EAP-TLS, Zhang et al.
approached the solution in a formal manner. However, their
approach has some limitations due to their assumption of per-
fect cryptography, whichmay not hold in practical implemen-
tations [97]. There are several open issues that need attention
in securing SDN. For example, network virtualization in SDN
is vulnerable to multiple issues such as rewrite problems,
spoofing attacks, implementation of action isolation, andDoS
attacks etc. [94]. In the future, these security challenges at the
transport layer need to be addressed by the security commu-
nity to ensure the security of 5G.
VII. NETWORK LAYER
The network layer instructs packet routing. This layer sup-
ports adding information as to where, how, and when packet
routing happens in order to prevent congestion. With 5G
networking, security will need to be implemented in multiple
OSI model layers to ensure the protection of data. ICN plays
an important role at the network layer as well, as it has been
proposed as a new paradigm to tackle the inefficiencies and
architectural problem of existing networks. The network layer
of ICN assigns a unique name to each content, which is later
used for routing over the network. Different from IP-based
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routing, content requests search for the closest available copy
regardless of the destination machine’s address.
This section investigates the security issues of both tradi-
tional IP-based content routing and ICN. In the former archi-
tecture, we investigate the use of IPsec to achieve security
at the network layer. Figure 6 summarizes the security and
vulnerability threats at the network layer.
A. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
Breaking the IPSec is generally considered not feasible [15].
However, IPSec alone cannot provide security for 5G net-
working. It must work in conjunction with other successful
security protocols in other layers of the OSI model to ensure
security [15].
Apart from generic threats like DoS, other threats from the
network layer perspective include man-in-the-middle attack,
IP Spoofing, injection, eavesdropping, packet sniffing, and
Gateway attacks represent a significant threat. Due to the new
technologies in 5G, specialized threats such as virtualization
and multi-edge computing, edge node overload, and abusing
of edge open APIs need to be taken into consideration [99].
One of the innovations that is proposed in 5G network stan-
dard is network slicing, which has unique security challenges.
For example, if an adversary gets access to one slice, they can
conduct attacks on other network slices, resulting in secu-
rity threats toward confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Specifically, if an adversary is able to tamper the network
slice selection data, unauthorized devices or the adversaries
may use such information to connect to a particular network
slice and consume resources [100]. Network Function Virtu-
alization Infrastructure, which is part of 5G network, has sev-
eral potential threats and vulnerabilities, such as the potential
infection of Virtual Machine (VM) images by the attacker.
These infections, in turn, result in data leakage, DoS attacks,
performance degradation of other VMs, and hijacking of the
components of the compromised hypervisor [41].
Although ICN may prevent attacks to the IP-based internet
architecture such as DoS, it is still vulnerable to different
types of attacks [101]. In fact, resource exhaustion, publisher
unavailability, and route depletion pose threats toward the
availability of the content. For instance, considering stateful
routing, routers need to keep record of requested/received
packets per interface until the request is consumed. This
mechanism is vulnerable to DoS attacks, in which the attacker
aims at disrupting forward services or overloading network
traffic by issuing an excessive number of requests. Requests
flooding can also be exploited to jeopardize the publisher’s
availability. In fact, by sending an excessive number of
requests for the same content publisher, the publisher’s avail-
ability is undermined and the related content unreachable.
In route depletion attacks, saturation is exploited at the rout-
ing table, filling it with malicious content belonging to differ-
ent domains. This jeopardizes the correct forward of content
requests to publishers or to available cached data copies.
Furthermore, delay in the replies or lack of replies may also
be exploited by an attacker to disrupt users’ services [102].
FIGURE 6. Security and privacy threats at the network layer.
Content caching exhibits vulnerabilities undermining content
integrity and availability. Examples of attacks toward caching
include cache snooping, pollution and poisoning [101].
In cache snooping, the attacker obtains sensitive information
regarding a user or a group of users, therefore undermining
their privacy. This may be obtained by gaining access to lists
of cached content and by monitoring its content, or the time
difference between replies from publisher or nearby caches.
The gain obtained by caching may be disrupted by means
of cache pollution. In fact, if an attacker populates a cache
with useless content, the routing algorithm needs to search
content in remote points in the network. Cache poisoning also
exploits the injection of malicious data in caches. In this case,
however, the attacker’s goal is to distribute fake content in the
network [103].
B. SECURITY SOLUTIONS, CHALLENGES AND GAPS
For the segment between the Broadcast Multicast - Service
Center and Evolved Node Base station, IPSec can provide
authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality over a unicast
link [15]. Implementation of IPSec at the network layer
will be fundamental in providing confidentiality, integrity,
data-origin authentication, and protection against replay
attacks for each individual packet [6], [104]. Unfortunately,
IPSec cannot extend all the way to the User Equipment
(UE). We will discuss different security measures in the
Physical layer section to provide base station to UE security
solutions. Saleem et al. propose in [99] bio-inspired tech-
niques to address several types of network attacks. However,
the authors have not implemented and evaluated their
approach [99]. While some solutions have been proposed
for network slicing, there are several limitations and gaps
that need to be addressed. Machine learning-based solutions
have been proposed to address the security threats in network
layer. However, the experimentation has not been conducted
in a realistic scenario, so the proposed solutions cannot
be deemed as reliable in real-world scenarios [105], [106].
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For a successful deployment of ICN, security solutions
should provide content integrity and availability, authenticity,
certified content provenance, and ensure users’ privacy [71].
In order to prevent the aforementioned DoS attacks to content
routing, hash functions on pending request tables have been
proposed as a countermeasure. Content caching attacks may
instead be prevented by means of signature verification, and
by monitoring caches’ content. Although different solutions
have been proposed for content routing [107]–[109] and
caching attacks [110]–[112], still mobility and scalability
represent a significant challenge. Furthermore, centralization
shall be avoided, in order to prevent a single point of fail-
ure being a target for the attacker. Figure 7 summarizes the
security and vulnerability threats at the data link layer.
VIII. DATA LINK LAYER
The data link layer supports the integrity of the point-to-point
transmission. It determines what type of technology and pro-
tocol is being used, so data can be successfully transferred to
the physical layer [59]. The 5G protocols consists of a user
plane (UP) and a control plane (CP). The UP layer refers to
the Data Link Layer. This layer is made up of four differ-
ent sublayers: service data adaptation protocol, packet data
convergence protocol, radio link control, and medium access
control [113]. In 5G, flexibility is one important security
requirement that needs to be considered. For example, some
applications would require end-to-end security rather than
relying on the security functionality provided by the core net-
work. For those applications, that require end to end security,
the applications would require security considerations in data
link layer [114]
Wireless point-to-point protocol transmission examples
are IEEE 802.11 and Bluetooth. The standard 802.11, also
known as WiFi, is the original wireless local area net-
work standard protocol which has since been improved to
802.11ac, with a transfer max rate of 1.3 gigabytes per second
[59], [113]. Bluetooth, on the other hand, has a max rate
of three megabytes per second and a much smaller range of
connectivity of 10 meters [59]. In this section we discuss the
vulnerabilities and solutions for IEEE 802.11 and Bluetooth.
A. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
TheAccess Stratum (AS) that is associatedwith the UP traffic
is vulnerable to multiple threats, and further protection is
required. This, in turn, results in customer data and communi-
cation flow being intercepted between the user equipment and
centralized server by the rogue base stations. Possible solu-
tions include Integrity Protection security algorithms [115].
Sybil attack also represent a threat in this context, where the
attacker replicates and manages more than one identity on a
single device [116].
In 2015, C. Kolias et al. released a study on IEEE
802.11 security protocols. WEP, WPA and WPA2 were
studied to identify vulnerabilities relating to 5G network-
ing. The study concluded that easily obtainable penetration
tools are effective and good enough to break IEEE 802.11
security [113]. For example, CloudCracker is capable of
evaluating 300 million WPA passwords in 20 minutes, and
therefore potentially cracking a WiFi password in a reason-
able time frame [113]. Bluetooth is a high-risk protocol in
public areas because of the ease of transferring data to a
close range [59]. Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing are two types
of attacks that, when a user accepts an unsolicited message,
result in personal information leakage [59]. Attacks in the
mobile edge computing environment is possible in this layer
through DDoS type of attacks [115].
The routing process, i.e., delivery of the packet from the
sender to the transmitter in a multi-hop network, may be
vulnerable to different types of attack. In particular, blackhole
attacks are the most impactive ones. In a blackhole attack the
attacker, upon receiving a packet to forward in the routing
process, eliminates the packet therefore preventing it from
reaching the intended receiver [117], [118]. A different ver-
sion of this attack is grayhole attack, with the main differ-
ence that the attacker does not systematically drop packets.
Instead, packets are dropped in a random fashion [119].
Although grayhole attacks may have lower impact in the
overall network, they are also more difficult to be identified,
as random drops may be due to malfunctioning of devices.
Another variant of this attack is given by the sinkhole attack,
where a node advertises itself as the best route in the network,
such that packets are pass through it and are redirected to the
sink node and hence discarded [120].
In a fog environment, IoT devices are vulnerable to mul-
tiple treats at the data link layer. In fact, due to their lim-
ited power resources and to the huge number of connected
devices, they provide multiple attack surfaces [121]. Exam-
ple of such attacks are DoS, and replay attacks, where a data
packet is captured by the attacker and retransmitted in later
sessions to impersonate the victim node. Furthermore, these
devices are vulnerable to sybil attacks, where malicious node
generates a fake virtual node to exploit resources from the
network.
B. SECURITY SOLUTIONS, CHALLENGES AND GAPS
Some of the attacks at the data link layer could be pre-
vented by end-to-end security encryption protocols such as
SSL [115]. Threat intelligence solutions usingmachine learn-
ing and artificial intelligence can also be applied to mitigate
threats at the user plane level. For example, device type and
behavior profile can be detected to identify and mitigate
botnets, malware, DDoS attacks etc. Augmented protection
approaches using extensible authentication protocol (EAP)
may help the core network to authenticate the devices the
secondary protection at this layer [115].
Authors in [113] suggest two solutions for WiFi security,
1) updating the firmware on Access Points, and 2) deploy-
ing Machine Learning-based Intrusion Detection Systems.
In [116] authors suggest the use of Received Singal Strength
(RSS) to identify and exclude intruders that duplicated a node
identity in 802.11 ad hoc based networks. The study in [113]
indicates that updating the firmware may be impractical.
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FIGURE 7. Security and privacy threats at the data link layer.
With respect to the machine learning-based solution, the slow
convergence of the learning algorithms is an issue for their
application in Intrusion Detection System, and should be
taken into consideration. This is particularly critical when
mitigating real-time attacks. Real time solutions for machine
learning-based intrusion detection systems represent a fun-
damental component of 5G network. A possible solution is
proposed by authors in [122], where a light gradient boosting
machine is used as detection algorithm.A deep learning based
approach is proposed by authors in [123], where an autoen-
coder network is trained to recognize four different type of
attacks. Although most of the intrusion detection systems is
based on machine learning techniques [124], non machine
learning-based solutions can be exploited to mitigate the
aforementioned shortcomings. For instance, the energy con-
sumption of nodes and a suitable blacklist can be exploited
in conjunction with connected dominating sets [125].
A different approach for intrusion detection considers also
the location of the devices, where a null space-based homo-
morphic MAC scheme can be deployed to guarantee effi-
cient detection in terms of computational complexity and
communication overhead [126]. Cause effect relationship
an also be exploited for intrusion detection. In particular,
a code book based approach can be exploited to associate
keys to alerts to facilitate the alert correlation process [127].
However, significant research efforts are still needed to
provide general real-time intrusion detection systems. As
a third-party security measure, a Virtual Private Network
(VPN), can provide an additional layer of security by acting
as a container for the 802.11 network [113]. Bluetooth can
be secured by simply making the device undiscoverable
when in public areas [59]. In regards to the DDoS types of
attacks, a combination of caching, anti-DDoS technologies
can mitigate the DDoS attacks [115]. One of the important
challenges for security solution at this layer is balancing
latency and power requirements as the high-speed encryp-
tion and integrity requirements would mean high power
consumption, which is again a limitation in the mobile
environment [115]. To address the Sybil and replication
attacks, techniques such as building trusted certification
solution for infrastructure-less domain. In addition, the tech-
niques such as resource (radio, storage and computational)
testing and position verification, to counter identity
replication and spoofing [116].
Different solutions have been proposed in literature to
mitigate blackhole, grayhole, and sinkhole attacks. The joint
identification of blackhole and grayhole attacks has been
proposed by authors in [125], and a preamble TDMA solution
is proposed to mitigate the effect of such attacks. Authors
in [119] propose a system based on trust levels assigned to
node. Data is periodically collected from network’s nodes to
verify both the data authenticity and consequently assign a
trust level. A solution based on count based detection scheme
has been proposed by authors in [120] to mitigate sinkhole
attacks. Each node in the network needs to report its hop count
to the base station, which keeps track of the values reported
by each node to detect possible sinkhole attacks.
Solutions for fog computing and IoT devices include
authorization, cryptography, collision detection and error cor-
recting codes [121].
IX. PHYSICAL LAYER
The physical layer, also known as layer one, deals with
voltage values, which in turn are converted to digital signals,
and transmitted by a physical electrical or optical port [59].
The core of the 5G infrastructure will remain connected with
physical fiber cable, but the edge of the 5G infrastructure -
the segment closest to the UE - will be predominately
wireless [14], [16], [128]. Three progressive 5G technologies
are within the wireless segment: HetNet, massiveMIMO, and
mmWave [128], [129]. The term HetNet refers to a network
in which different cell types and access technologies coexist,
playing a fundamental role in the expansion of the 5G net-
work. Massive MIMO envisions the deployment of a larger
number of antennas compared to previous antennas tech-
nology. mmWave instead envisions the shift towards higher
transmission frequencies. Therefore, MIMO and mmWave
refer to more physical related aspects. Since wireless signals
are transmitted through the air, hackers have opportunities to
to intercept and interfere with the wireless segment [128].
In this section, we discuss the physical layer security and
threats in 5G networks. Figure 8 summarizes the security and
vulnerability threats at the physical layer.
A. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
Due to the transmission of wireless signals in free space,
attackers can obtain private information from oscillations in
the observed power [14]. Eavesdropping enables the attacker
to obtain cipher text. Merely obtaining the cipher text does
not mean the attacker can read it. However, if a large number
of cipher texts is captured, it is easier to infer the security
scheme applied at the upper OSI layers, and opening the gate
for private information to be stolen [14]. Data fabrication and
privacy violation attacks exploit physical layer vulnerabili-
ties during wireless transmissions [5]. Signal amplification
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FIGURE 8. Security and privacy threats at the physical layer.
attacks currently exist in 4G networks and are expected to
increase on 5G. A signal amplification attack can be per-
formed by botnets using various infected devices within a
single cell area [42], [43]. The increase in ports on mobile
devices opens the possibility of attacks through multiple
forms of connectivity [42]. Ports can be physical and logi-
cal. Mobile devices are especially vulnerable to logical port
attacks, as each mobile app may present the opportunity for
an attacker to take advantage of an open port in the individual
app. According to the University of Michigan, open ports can
be used to obtain private information [130]. As each user adds
a new app to their mobile device, the vulnerabilities increase.
One of the security issues concerning heterogeneous net-
work is how to define an access authentication method that
can adapt to various network structures [131]. Also, due to
the open nature of the wireless channel of 5G heterogeneous
networks, the wireless communication system is more vul-
nerable to imitation, theft, and other external attacks that
needs attention and security by design. Due to the complex
nature and higher requirements for 5G networks, the result-
ing wireless communication network system is complex
and highly modular. Hence, if one module is under attack,
the entire wireless communication network system security
is jeopardized.
B. SECURITY SOLUTIONS, CHALLENGES AND GAPS
Atat et al. and Gao et al. provide three possible solutions to
eavesdropping: power control, beamforming, and clustering
[5], [14]. Power control relies on detecting the wire-tappers
and adjusting the transmission power. By making changes to
the transmission power, the eavesdropper will not be able
to access the private information [14]. Beamforming also
involves identifying attackers by using transmission power.
Beamforming and power control can be used together, but
the algorithm implementing such a solution has not been per-
fected yet [14]. Clustering involves grouping users together to
keep out the hacker [5], [14]. Clustering must work hand in
hand with a method to identify the hackers, such that they can
be isolated from a non-hacker group [14]. It is also suggested
by authors in [5] that Device to Device (D2D) communication
can help in defending against eavesdropping, data fabrication,
and policy violations by defining a specific spatial transmis-
sion region that guarantees a minimum secrecy rate. PLS is
a new network security solution that entails the use of noise,
interference and fading to decrease the ability for intruders
to capture readable data [132]. Yang et al. [128] state that
degrading signal reception can be exploited as a security
mechanism to prevent intruders from obtaining confiden-
tial information. Furthermore, they also show the benefits
of a decreased computational complexity with respect to
higher layers cryptography [128]. Reduced power consump-
tion and artificial noise insertion in massive MIMO systems
are effective in averting eavesdropping attacks [128]. As for
devices’ ports, a suggested workplace solution is to scan all
employees’ phones for viruses or scan employees’ phones
randomly [42].
A PLS solution against eavesdroppers has been proposed
by authors in [133]. Authors propose a jamming solution to
design secure routing paths in multi-hop decentralized IoT,
showing good performance against an increasing number of
eavesdroppers. A further solution for secure routing has been
proposed by authors in [134], where authors propose a jam-
mingmechanismwith optimized transmit power to efficiently
deliver the content while preserving data security. In the
MIMO context, different PLS solutions based on artificial
noise have been proposed. A viable solution is represented
by the introduction of an Imaginary Receiver (IR), and the
precoding matrix is generated targeting the IR. This solution
provides the advantage that the imaginary receiver does not
feedback its channel response hence preventing eavesdrop-
ping of the precoder matrix [135]. Artificial noise can also be
designed to lie in the null subspace of the receiver channel
while being present in all other channels [136], [137]. Arti-
ficial noise is also used in intelligent transportation systems.
For instance, it can be exploited to guarantee a secure com-
munication while offloading part of the data from increased
network quality of service [138]. Furthermore, multiple vehi-
cles can be exploited to cooperatively generate noise schemes
to secure the communication [139].
mmWave has limitations, which can be turned into ben-
efits. mmWave is deemed to have built-in security and pri-
vacy due to limited transmission area, inability to penetrate
solid materials, and the narrow beam widths [140]. By using
mmWave in private or public office buildings, it is possi-
ble to prevent leakage of information outside the building.
Tang et al. propose PLS enhancements for authentication,
secret key distribution, and secure communication perspec-
tive to defend against security attacks in 5G networks [141].
Alquhayz et al. implemented a policy-based security
management system to ensure that end-user devices can-
not be used as weapons or tools of attack. They eval-
uated the proposed framework by implementing it using
threat models such as IP spoofing and man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attacks [142]. However, the framework is limited
by a methodology that gives isolated end-user devices their
privileges back [142]. Zhou et al. noted that sharing of
large-scale spectrum in 5G heterogeneous networks leads
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to many security and privacy challenges [143]. To address
these issues, they developed a privacy-preserving, incentive-
compatible, and spectrum-efficient framework that is based
on blockchain. In this framework, they built a smart contract,
which allows the users to sign a contract with the base sta-
tion for spectrum sharing and receive dedicated payments
based on their contributions. In addition, they also built the
framework to support the details of secure spectrum sharing
and consensus-based incentive mechanism design [143]. The
proposed solution is limited due to performance degradation
issues, which can be improved further by learning through
historical observations such as user behavior, load profiles
and traffic distribution. The solution also did not consider
multiple service providers or multiple base stations. The hash
algorithms that aid the proof of work has vulnerabilities, and
they need to be addressed [143]. Lv et al. implemented a deep
learning solution to solve the security issues of the 5G hetero-
geneous network from the physical layer perspective [131].
In addition, they also surveyed and presented the existing
security issues in 5G heterogeneous networks. The proposed
method only handles the issues at the physical layer and not
the other layers, such as network layer. According to Lv et al.,
the security problems in the network layer will need to be
discussed in future works.
Anum et al. surveyed and presented the physical layer
security issues of massive MIMO-enabled Heterogeneous
networks [144]. They also provided an insight into the secrecy
outage and secrecy rates of the users when their security is
breached by attackers. Anum et al. observed that a trade-off
exists between the optimal coverage and the secrecy in the
network, and further work needs to be done to optimize the
coverage and ensure security. Wu et al. utilized the intrinsic
randomness of the transmission channel to guarantee the
security in the physical layer challenged by the heterogeneous
networks [32]. They also outlined several challenges that
need to be handled as a part of future work. For example,
most works for physical layer security in heterogeneous net-
works focus on analyzing the security performance of the
networks [32]. Since multiple users have access to multiple
tiers, a possible research strategy is to investigate how to
properly schedule these users access to different network ties
to better safeguard multi-tier communications.
As reflected above, many works in the literature have
focused on 5G security at the physical layer [44], [145]. It can
be concluded that PLS is the key framework for 5G security,
as it contributes to secure 5G at every layer of the OSI model.
However, due to the lack of direction as to which standards
will eventually be implemented in the 5G environment, it is
difficult to determine which protective measures are worth
further investigation. This uncertainty is not uncommon in
technology, and multiple standards are likely to be heavily
financed and researched. Since it has not been determined
if one single 5G technology, such as HetNets, will win out
over another, it is difficult to focus on one set of security
issues. For example, Cienamentions the use of heterogeneous
networks [16], while Verizon implements its 5G network
through small cell technology and mmWave bands [2]. The
scale of the 5G network could impact the ability of security
solutions to work [14], so HetNets, MIMO, mmWave, and
D2D, can be used depending on the scale of the solution.
X. SUMMARY OF 5G SECURITY CONCERNS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we showed that security concerns are still
present at each layer of the OSI model in 5G. Table 3 provides
a summary of the identified vulnerabilities, solutions and
challenges organized according to the OSI model. The table
begins with the Application layer and ends with the Physical
layer. In some cases, limited or null published information
was found regarding a specific solution or challenge.We indi-
cate these situations by a ‘‘not found’’ comment. Based on our
review, following are future 5G security research:
• Application Layer: scalability represents one of the
major threats to safe identity management in vehicu-
lar networks. While including blockchain technology
in different components of the network, increasing the
amount of transactions that the application layer bit-
coin protocol can handle per second represents one of
the main targets. Considering this improvement in the
transaction rate, researchers should also take care of
the arising security concerns connected with it. All new
network paradigms, such as SDN and ICN, may con-
tribute to increase the quality of the network in different
aspects. Still, data availability and user privacy need to
be fully investigated before their successful deployment.
AI may further contribute to a better network experience
both from designers’ and users’ perspectives. However,
significant threats are posed on user’s privacy and data
integrity.
• Presentation Layer: researchers should look at the sys-
tem for periodical review and update of the crypto-
graphic protocols to address data hiding and illegal input
into presentation layer protocols.
• Session Layer: researchers should pay particular atten-
tion to sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks. In addi-
tion, the EPS-AKA protocol should be enhanced by
looking into the key agreement from the home net-
work’s user equipment with respect to serving network
identification issues.
• Transport Layer: before SDN matures and 5G is gen-
erally deployed, it will be beneficial to pre-build SDN
security into the infrastructure.
• Network Layer: researchers should look at the ways
IPSec can be extended for 5G security to provide con-
fidentiality and integrity against replay attacks all the
way to the user equipment level. When considering ICN,
researchers should focus on the scalability of the net-
work. Furthermore, mobility poses a major challenge for
a secure deployment of ICN.
• Data Link Layer: researchers should improve the learn-
ing speed of machine learning based Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS) to ensure the feasibility of protecting
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TABLE 3. Summary of 5G security concerns and solutions by OSI layers.
against real-time attacks. Furthermore, researchers
should look at the noise interference issues in the RSS.
• Physical Layer: due to the numerous emerging technolo-
gies dealing with the physical layer of 5G, it could be
beneficial to narrow down the list of employed technolo-
gies to a small list in order to capture the best solution,
instead of deeply investigating multiple technologies.
Also, since signaling amplification is a known issue
in 4G, 5G solutions should consider it as a possible threat
to mitigate.
XI. CONCLUSION
5G technology is expected to connect billions of sensors [5]
and millions of devices [6]. There is a financial spend and
gain associated with these deployments that will impact the
world. Due to this significant impact, resolving security
issues is an important task for 5G companies, investors,
researchers and individuals. The expected quantity of con-
nected devices naturally expands the opportunity for hackers
to exploit networking at several layers of the OSI layer model.
While application-based encryption secures the application
itself, it is not sufficient to provide security for data travers-
ing 5G mobile networks due to power leakage in wireless
signaling [14]. 5G networks will require a different approach
from cryptographic techniques, with the viable solutions in
the domain of PLS [17], [128]. Our study reflects the high
research interest in securing 5G at the physical layer. Secu-
rity mechanisms such as noise interference, beamforming
and degrading signal reception are introduced in order to
protect data from threats such as eavesdropping and data
fabrication. In addition to the physical layer findings, we
identified security issues at the application layer with bitcoin
protocol and in connected cars. At the network layer, we
point out the importance of IPsec along with a penetration
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tool vulnerability with 802.11 at the data link layer. There
are known existing vulnerabilities and attacks at the session
layer, such as disclosure of user identify, DoS and man-in-
the-middle attacks with EPA-AKA and EPS-AKA. There is
an immediate opportunity for research at the session layer to
solve for the vulnerabilities, along with the opportunity to
secure emerging technologies like SDN. Organizations and
researchers can prepare for 5G by investing in areas where
vulnerabilities exist, and by ensuring emerging technologies
complement the existing security in all layers of the OSI
model.
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